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This anicle1 takes up the question of whether the law school clinic is a 
necessary or even preferred vehicle for clinical practice instruction,2 and its 
corollary of whether there are more interesting formats, closer in spirit to 
the purposes of a university law school, which would serve clinic.al 
instruction's objectives as well. Its answers are, respectively, "no. most of the 
time" and "yes, most of the time.·· In response to the first question, it argues 
that design and resource limitations prevent the typical clinic from 
performing important critical functions of legal education. and that for this 
reason the clinic will remain relegated to training tasks not considered 
important enough over the long run by a university law school. In response 
to the second, it recommends an alternative format for practice instruction 
which avoids these problems, describes its advantages over the conventional 
clinic, and discusses whether the objections typically made to this 
alternative are warranted. While principally about format, the article also 
articulates a conception of clinical study which is more compatible with 
university education than the conception now in place. Many will view this 
as a hopeless plan and perhaps they are right. But if we could get our 
thinking about clinical education straight, that sense of hopelessness would 
disappear. 
Roben J. Condlin is Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland Law School. 
Skeptical questioning by a law school dean prompted this article, and the author is grateful to 
him. 
I. The law school clinic has been a subject of discussion in the journals for some time, but I 
have not made an effort to incorporate that discussion or locate my position within it. (For 
references to and evaluations of some of that literature see Robert ]. Condlin, The Moral 
Failure of Clinical Legal Education. in The Good Lawyer: Lawyers' Roles and Lawyers' 
Ethics, ed. David Luban, 339-41 notes 1-22 (Totowa, N.J., 1984} (hereinafter cited as Moral 
Failure); and Robert J. Condlin, Socratt:s' New Clothes: Substituting Persuasion for 
Learning in Clinical Practice Instruction, 40 Md. L. Rev. 223, 223-26 notes 2. 3. 5, 6, 279 
note 118 (1980) (hereinafter cited as Socrates' New Clothes). 
2. Practice instruction is based on materials and experiences generated by student work for live 
clients in pending cases. It is to be distinguished, on the one hand, from clinical instruction 
generally, which is the study of lawyer skill practices in all of its forms. many of which take 
place outside of clinical practice, see note 6 infra, and on the other, from the law school 
clinic, which is only one format in which practice instruction occurs. Unless otherwise 
indicated or required by context. when I speak of clinical education. clinical study, clinical 
instruction, fieldwork or the like, I mean clinical practice instruction. 
«:~ 1986 by the Association of American Law Schools. Cite as 35 J. Legal Educ. 45 (1986\. 
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Two additional preliminary points should be made. First, few law 
teachers, once engaged, are unemotional or uncertain of their views about 
clinical instruction, and evaluative commentary, however tentative or 
limited, can provoke strong reaction from supporters and detractors alike. A 
discussion, therefore, should be perfectly clear about just how controversial 
it proposes to be. This article does not plan to question the legitimacy of 
clinical instruction per se. Such instruction, properly conceived, has 
substantial value and is an essential part of an overall program of law 
school education.3 That view is now widely accepted. While debate about 
"ultimate existence" is over, however, difficult questions remain about the 
form and content clinical instruction ought to have, and it is those 
questions that are taken up here. 
Second, discussion is limited to what may be called the conventional 
clinic, a law office established and operated by a law school for the purpose 
of student clinical practice. Excluded will be discussion of classroom and 
simulation-based approaches to clinical study, and fieldwork-based 
approaches, such as the clinical internship, or so-called farm-out program, 
in which the person responsible for student instruction is not a full-time 
member of the law school faculty. The conventional clinic is not the only 
format for practice instruction but by clinical teacher consensus it is the 
most effective, and it is preferred by most law schools. Schools that choose 
not to establish a conventional clinic usually have economic rather that 
pedagogic reasons for their decisions. Even in a post-CLEPR age, with the 
laudable demise of the "in-house" litmus test,4 the conventional clinic is 
primum inter paria, and a discussion of its strengths and weaknesses is 
generally thought to be a discussion of the best that clinical education has to 
offer. 
The Purpose of Clinical Practice Instruction 
Our starting point must be an understanding of what clinical practice 
instruction tries to accomplish. Over the years the most popular objectives 
have been training in the motor dimensions of lawyer practice skills (skills 
training); teaching ethics, both the development of character and informing 
about relevant codes and rules (ethics); internalizing the tacit norms and 
lore of law practice (socialization); inspecting particular types of lawyer 
work prior to job selection (placement); increasing self-awareness of 
dispositions and values likely to affect performances as lawyers (self-
awareness); teaching doctrine and analysis in an engaging fashion 
(pedagogy); and understanding and criticizing standard ways of performing 
lawyer practice skills for their contributions, both in specific instances and 
3. The author supports this claim in Condlin. Moral Failure, supra note I, at 319-24; and 
Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes, supra note I, at 227 note 10. 
4. See Condlin, Moral Failure, supra note I. at 332-36: and Condlin. Socrates' New Clothes, 
supra note I. at 223-24 note 2, for a description of CLEPR, (The Council on Legal 
Education for Professional Responsibility). its role in the development of clinical 
education. and the ways in which it conditioned both recognition of a rlinical program and 
eligibility for financial support on whether the program had convt>ntional properties. 
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in the aggregate, to the legal system and the outcomes it produces 
(critique).5 Usually, clinical teachers have favorites among these objectives 
and shape their programs to emphasize one or two in a sustained and 
systematic way. But this narrowing of focus can create problems if the 
teachers choose unwisely, for the objectives exist in a hierarchy, and critique 
is at the top. This fact has consequences for all the decisions involved in 
constructing a clinical program and in teaching a clinical course.6 
Clinical critique takes as its subject the skill practices (and the theories on 
which they are based) lawyers use to give effect to legal rules and is 
5. On the objectives of clinical education see generally Anthony Amsterdam, Clinical Legal 
Education: A 21st Century Perspective. 34 J. Legal Educ. 612 (1984); Mark \'. Tushnet, 
Scenes from the Metropolitan Underground: A Critical Perspective on the Status of 
Clinical Education, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 27:~ (1984): Condlin. Moral Failure, supra note 
1, at 318-24: FrankS. Bloch, The Andragogic.1l Basis of Clinical Legal Education. 35 \'and. 
L. Rev. 321. 322-25 (1982) and articles cited therein; Kenneth R. Kreiling. Clinical 
Education and Lawyer Competency: The Process of Learning to Learn from Experience 
through Properly Structured Clinical Supervision. ·10 Md. L. Rev. 284 (1981 ); Carrie 
Menkel·Meadow, The Legacy of Clinical Educdtion: Theories about Lawyering, 29 Clev. 
St. L. Rev. 555 (1980); David R. Barnhizer. The Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: Its 
Theory and Implementation, 30 J. Legal Educ. 67 (1979); john 1\1. Ferren. Goals. Models. 
and Prospects for Clinical Legal Education, in Clinical Education and the Law School of 
the Future, ed. Edmund W. Kitch, 94 (University of Chicago Law School Conference Series 
No. 20, 1969). 
6. The conventional clinic is only a small part of the clinical curriculum. An ideal curriculum 
would begin with classroom survey courses in lawyer practices based on social science 
research data and scholarship about the profession and videotapes of lawyers acting in role. 
In analyzing this material students would develop intellectual categories that put practice 
experiences into larger context, and develop the \"Oc-abulary necessary to discuss lawyer 
behavior with others. See Gary Bellow &: Bea Moulton, The Lawyering Process: Materials 
for the C.linical Instruction in Advocacy (Mineola. N.Y .. 1978), for an illustration of the 
concepts with which such courses would work. Much of the cognitive instruction now 
done in clinics could be removed to this type of course. 
Survey courses would be followed by seminars examining selected subparts of the clinical 
subject matter in greater depth, in major part through the use of role playing. gaming. and 
simulation methodologies. (Interviewing and Counseling, Investigation and Discovery. 
and Bargaining and Negotiation are the more common titles and subject matter 
subdivisions of. these courses.) Survey and simulation courses would precede clinical 
practice and be prerequisites to it, and the conceptual apparatus and beginning motor-
skills developed in these courses would help students exploit more of the potential of the 
real life setting. A sequence of prerequisites also would help minimize the problem of 
overgeneralization. Left on their own, students understandably view their first practice 
experiences as everyman's and miss the richness of variation that a truly big picture 
provides. But if the variation is described in advance the limits of individual experiences 
can be noticed or pointed out. 
Notwithstanding that it comes last, and that most students will not do it, clinical practice 
is an important part of this overall program. Critique presupposes understanding of lawyer 
practices, and understanding in turn presupposes some experience with the practices· 
operation. This is not a radical view. In fact. a version of it underlies the socratic paradigm 
of first year law teaching. First year teachers do not believe that students understand case 
analysis after being told, among other things, that it consists of assessing changing fact 
patterns to identify legally relevant considerations that matter and distinguish them from 
those that do not. It also is thought necessary that students try their hands at assessment and 
subject their efforts to a law professor's evaluation. The discussions that ensue are expected 
not just to increase skill proficiency at comparing cases (though that is a goal). but to 
enhance understanding of relevant legal similarities and differences. Understanding. as 
much as skill, is the object of this process. Understanding is not the same as critique. 
however, and traditional instruction is often as ddiciem as clinical in failing to take this 
next step. 
• 
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concerned with understanding and evaluating the manner in which such 
practices contribute to the justice of the legal system.7 These practices are 
important because they make up the low-visibility ways in which lawyers 
amend, abrogate, and enforce the law, and in the process, determine much 
of law's meaning for persons who come in contact with it.8 The practices are 
amenable to theoretical elaboration, support multiple research agendas, and 
can be divided, categorized, and sequenced conceptually for purposes of 
instruction.9 In addition, they provide a distinct and relatively unexplored 
vantage point on the operation of the legal system from which new critical 
insights about law about law may be produced. and these insights in turn 
will have implications for the ways in which statutes are drafted and 
doctrines elaborated.10 One can have normative theories about the proper 
performance of lawyer practices, and theories about how lawyer practices 
contribute to the justice of the legal system as a whole. While clinical 
thinking in each of these areas is far from developed, the work to be done is 
familiar and manageable. 11 In studying lawyer-skill practices, teachers and 
students come to see how the individual actions of lawyers constitute and 
reconstitute legal rules, and how the legal system's kantian (rule/policy) 
and aristotelian (lawyer dispositional) halves fit together. 
Critique consists of analyzing and evaluating the patterns and theories 
immanent in the methods lawyers use to perform and think about skill 
practices against conceptions of what would be better, for the purpose of 
resolving perceived contradictions between theory and practice.J2 This 
analysis presupposes a critical theory, which in turn presupposes worked-
out views on the nature of a fair and just legal system and the role of lawyer 
7. These practices can be thought of generically as inquiry, bargaining, persuasion, planning 
and so on, or in task specific terms such as interviewing, counseling, negotiation, witness 
examination, oral argument and the like. See Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes, supra note I, 
at 224-25 note 3, for a description of the benefits to be gained from looking at these 
practices from each perspective. 
8. See e.g., Robert J. Condlin, Cases on Both Sides: Patterns of Argument in Legal Dispute· 
Negotiation, 44 Md. L Rev. 65 (1985) (illustrating the ways in which lawyer argument 
practices give varying content to the same su6stantive norms in different legal disputes). 
See also Gerald R. WiJJiams, Legal Negotiation and Settlement 6-7 (St. Paul, Minn .. 1983) 
(variable results reached by differing teams of lawyer negotiators settling the same case); 
Douglas E. Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client: Who's in Charge 202-205 (New York. 1974) 
(variable assessments of the legal strength of the same case made by different experts). 
9. See Bellow 8: Moulton, supra note 6, for one such conceptualization. 
10. See Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes, supra note I, at227-28 note 10, for a description of the 
contributions of the clinical perspective 10 the study of traditional substantive law 
questions. See also Robert H. Mnooldn 8: Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow ur 
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale LJ. 950, 977-980 ( 1979) (description of substantive 
law insights suggested by the perspective of lawyer bargaining). 
II. For examples of the best clinical work of this type to date see infra note 43. For interesting 
traditional law teacher contributions to this literature see Walter Probert 8: Louis M. 
Brown, Theories and Practices in the Legal Profession, 19 U. Fla. L. Rev. 447 (1966); Irvin 
C. Rutter, A Jurisprudence of Lawyer's Operations, 13 J. Legal Educ. 301 (1961). 
12. On critique see Raymond Guess, The Idea or a Critical Theory: Habermas 8: Thr Frankrurt 
School 55-95 (New Rochelle, 1981). See also Rirhard J. Bernstein, The Restructuring or 
Social and Political Thought 173-225 (Philadelphia. 1976!. 
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practices in operating and improving it.I3 This theory can be a psychology 
of law practice, in which individual lawyer behavior is viewed as relatively 
discrete and self-contained action and the principles that explain its 
operation are identified and categorized, 14 or a kind of legal sociology (or 
economics), in which principles of individual action are replaced by 
equivalent principles about legal institutions and systems, and lawyer 
behavior is explained by the incentives and constraints of the social matrix 
in which it occurs. 15 A psychology or sociology is not critical, however, 
until it challenges prevailing conceptions of good behavior and identifies 
(even if only implicitly) better ways of thinking about and performing in 
lawyer role. To make judgments about what would be better, principles of 
individual action and social organization must be linked to a theory of 
society or theory of justice, a theory of the way in which lawyers and legal 
institutions ought to operate in order that fair and just states of affairs be 
produced. 16 These theories can be incomplete, tentative, or not wholly (or 
13. I£ critical theory is understood in its strictest sense. as encompassing the critique of ideology 
(ldeologiekritik,) this may require too much. In Ideologiekritik the theorizing agent 
becomes object as well as subject by including his own behavior, including his own 
theorizing, within the ambit of his criticism. /d. The goal is to produce "emancipatory 
insight," that which transcends ideological constraints. even those of which the agent is 
unaware, in part through dialogic interaction with self-reflective and communicatively 
competent subjects. See e.g., Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests 310 
(Boston, 1971). For the Hegelian, this activity also may be seen as part of an innate 
dialectical drive to absolute knowledge grounded in the idealist presupposition of the 
identity of thought and being. See Alan Montefiore &: Charles Taylor, From an Analytical 
Perspective, in Garbis Kortian, Metacritique 10 (New York, 1980). At this level. a critical 
theory is a theory of criticism as well as a theory of society. Few political philosophers (let 
alone law teachers) claim to have a worked out critique of ideology, however, (even more 
deny its possibility), and more cannot be expected from persons whose interest in the field 
is, of necessity, secondary. So while I do not rule out efforts by clinical teachers at 
Ideologiekritik, and some will struggle with this difficult task, see e.g .• Dean H. Rivkin. 
Law Reform and the Faces of Power, (unpublished paper) {copy on file with author). for 
most a psychology of law practice or a legal sociology, combined with a "practical" theory 
of justice, will be sufficient. See Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice 255 (Boston. 1973), 
on the nature of "practical" theories; and Sir David Ross. The Nichomachean Ethics of 
Aristotle 28-39 (New York. 1975), on "practical" wisdom. See also Bernstein. supra note 12. 
at 187-88 (discussion of the difference between practical and technical theories). 
14. There are many such psychologies now in clinical use. See e.g .. David A. Binder&: Susan C. 
Price, Legal Interviewing and Counseling {St. Paul. Minn .. 1977); Thomas Shaffer, Legal 
Interviewing and Counseling in a Nutshell (St. Paul, Minn., 1976); Andrew Watson. Legal 
Interviewing and Counseling (Indianapolis, 1976). But see William H. Simon. Homo 
Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism. 32 Stan. L. Rev. 487 (1980) {criticizing 
the psychological vision underlying clinical study as a new legal formalism). 
15. There are only a few clinical sociologies, see e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another 
View of Negotiation: The Structure o£ Legal Problem Solving, 31 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 754 
(1984), and, to my knowledge, no economics. 
16. An illustration will help. Simon's claim that lawyers cannot investigate client ends without 
imputing them, and that to impute ends is to impose a structure of professional 
domination, is critique. See William H. Simon. The Ideology o£ Advocacy: Procedural 
Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 30, 52-59 (1978). It is a social-
psychological claim grounded in a political theory which can say why domination is bad. 
(I do not suggest that Simon's claim is correct. just that, i£ correct, it is an illustration of 
critique.) Binder and Price's observation. on the other hand. that characteristics o£ lawyer 
questioning shape and restrict client responses is not (yet) critique. because it is only a 
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even in major part) original, as long as they are also coherent, intelligent, 
and genuinely open to further development. Clinical teachers do not have to 
be original political thinkers, but they should have a political dimension to 
their conception of the clinical subject.J7 
Political critique is the most important clinical objective for several 
reasons. To begin with, it is the objective most adapted to the university 
setting in which legal instruction occurs. Critique is a university's reason 
for being, its identifying characteristic, and the only one of its multiple 
functions it fails to perform at the price of being a university. Stripped of its 
critical role, the university is a mere ·socializing agent, an instrument of 
prevailing orthodoxy, engaged only in legitimation and control. One might 
be skeptical about the modern university's commitment to critique and this 
would be fair. Day-to-day university activity is often mundane; critique is 
rare, and socialization and control are commonplace. But critique is the 
university's highest function, its aspiration, the source of its greatest 
potential and its o<;casional achievement and it remains the strongest basis 
of the argument for the university's existence.'8 
The critical task is particularly important to the university law school. 
The ability to judge day-to-day law practice against objective standards of 
social-psychological claim and cannot, on its own terms, say whether influencing client 
responses is good or bad. See Binder & Price, supra note 14, at 40-47. Binder and Price's 
analysis has an inchoate political dimension, but until that dimension is developed their 
analysis cannot be said to be critical. For some, identifying contradictions between 
another's theory (about which one has no position) and practice also counts as critique, 
and avoiding inconsistency or self-contradiction is the only necessary substantive norm. 
Guess has called this type of criticism "genetic" and found it wanting, in major part 
because of its ambivalence about substance. See Guess, supra note 12, at 26-44. 
17. Clinicians have traditionally been more interested in social psycholog~ than politics. See 
e.g., Menkel-Meadow's analysis of negotiation behavior, in which she makes claims that 
seem necessarily grounded in political theory but which are defended almost exclusively in 
social-psychological terms. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15. For a beginning analvsis of the 
political dimensions of negotiation and bargaining, see Gerald j. Postema, Coordination 
and Convention at the Foundations of Law, II J. Legal Studies 165 (1982): David Luban, 
Bargaining and Compromise: Recent Work on Negotiation and Informal justice, H Phil. 
& Pub. Affairs 397 (1985). Nonclinical teachers are often no better than clinicians at 
incorporating political theory, but that is not to say that traditional and clinical teacher~. 
as groups. are equally undeveloped. There is a large body ol traditional legal scholarship 
drawing on critical social theory (see e.g., relevant excerpts from the following symposia or 
symposia facsimile: Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 36 Stan. L. Rev. I (1984); The Fiss· 
Brest Debate on Interpretation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 739 (1982); Symposium: Law and 
Literature, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373 (1982): A Symposium: The Public/Private Distinction, 130 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1289 (1982); Symposium on Legal Scholarship, 90 Yale L.j. 955 (1981), and 
individual articles, see e.g., Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/ Post modern 
Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 291 (1985); joseph William Singer, The Player 
and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale L.j. I (1984), and this thinking 
increasingly is entering mainstream law teaching. In addition, because traditional law 
teaching materials (including casebooks) frequently embody critical perspectives, law 
teachers using such materials present such views even without trying to. While it would be 
better if these efforts were conscious, coherent tacit political analysis is better than none. 
18. On the nature of the university, see Charles Wegener, Liberal Education and the Modt•rn 
University (Chicago, 1978): joseph j. Schwab, College Curriculum and Student Protest 
(Chicago, 1969); Laurence R. Veysey, The Emergence of the American University (Chit-ago, 
1965). 
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justice and fairness is an essential quality of a good citizen and a good 
lawyer.19 Yet legal work settings make this kind of deliberation difficult. 
Lawyer tasks have predefined instrumental ends and lawyer roles come with 
a full complement of powerfully felt self-interests, and the combination of 
the two often distorts critical thinking and sometimes corrupts it. For most, 
law school provides the last unrestricted opportunity to take a larger view, 
where "work" itself obliges one to develop a conception of lawyer behavior 
that serves more than selfish ends. In an important sense, the obligation to 
pursue critique is heightened not diminished by the fact that law school is 
the last step on a journey into a profession. 
In addition, in the legal system's educational division of labor critique of 
lawyer practices is the special domain of the clinical law teacher. Students 
learn about law practice from many directions and sources. Expert 
practitioners develop skills. law firms sociali:t.e. psychologists increase self-
awareness, placement officers find jobs. traditional law professors teach 
about doctrine and analysis, and philosophers develop ethical 
sophistication. These processes occur in clinics. but good instruction 
depends upon both format and expertise. and in most of these subjects 
clinical teachers are not expert, at least not in comparison with persons who 
work with the subjects full time. For some of these subjects, skills training is 
the best example, clinicians are additionally disabled becuase unlike 
practitioners, they do not work with students for a long enough period of 
time for the instruction to take hold. (Skills are based on habit and habit 
takes longer than a semester to develop.) Clinicians have time and 
opportunity to analyze lawyer skill practices, however, they can develop the 
necessary expertise and they are likely to be the only persons in the students' 
educational process concerned principally with this topic. Not to pursue the 
subject is to fail to deliver on the clinical teacher's implied promise to teach 
about lawyer practices as a critical perspective on law. 
Moreover, critique is the foundation on which the other clinical 
objectives rest. Even skills training presupposes critical judgments about 
what skills ought to be learned. in what order, and in what form, and these 
judgments in turn presuppose a conception of a fair and just legal system 
19. Most conceptions o£ lawyer role require that a lawyer be a political and moral agent. Even 
in Fish's view, where there seems to be the widest latitude (see Interpretation in Law: The 
Dworkin-Fish Debate [Or. Soccer amongst the Gahuku-Gama). 73 Calif. L. Rev. 158. 168 
[1985]). a lawyer must be capable o£ moral judgments and make them. See Stanley Fish. 
Interpretation and the Pluralist Vision, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 495. 501 (1982). For other 
conceptions o£ lawyer role representing radically different viewpoints. but all requiring a 
lawyer capacity for moral and political judgment. see Monroe H. Freedman. Lawyers and 
Ethics in an Adversary System (Indianapolis, 1975); Simon. supra note 16. at 130-44; 
Edward A. Dauer&: Arthur Lcff. C".orrespondence: The Lawyer as Friend. 86 Yale L.J. 573. 
580-84 (1975); Charles Frird, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the 
Lawyer-Client Relation. 85 Yale L.J. 1060 (1975). Perhaps Rov Cohn \oJould not require 
such judgments but few have accused Cohn of being a political or moral philosopher. See 
e.g., Roy Cohn, A Fool for a Client (New York. 1971 ). 
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and the role of lawyer practices in operating and improving it.2° One cannot 
say, for example, what kind of rhetorical and strategic maneuvering is 
proper in influencing an adversary to settle until one has worked out a 
moral and political view about how dispute negotiation ought to proceed.21 
For example, we do not call a person who fabricates evidence and obtains a 
favorable settlement as a result, skillful; we call him dishonest. And a person 
who curses an adverse negotiator because he knows the adversary will be 
upset and bargain badly is often thought of as abusive not skillful, even 
when the tactic succeeds. The concept of skill has no meaning outside an 
ever-changing and controversial normative context and it must be studied in 
that context to be understood. Political critique is a necessary not just 
interesting part of the study of skill, therefore, and those who fail to engage 
in it are forever at the mercy of the prevailing "wisdom" of their 
environments and the tacit biases imbedded in their personal beliefs. The 
subordination of skills training to critique does not preclude clinical 
courses emphasizing skills. But such training ought not to come first, it 
ought not to be pervasive, and even when pursued for its own sake it ought 
not to ignore altogether the critical background questions temporarily 
bracketed. 
In suggesting that clinical study ought to engage in critique of lawyer 
practices I make no judgments about the ouicome of that critique. Many 
standard conceptions of and methods for performing lawyer practices could 
be improved,22 but I do not assume at the outset that these conceptions or 
methods are corrupt, or that they systematically deny justice to a substantial 
part of the legal client population. In fact, I would not be surprised to learn 
that, as the end products of a complicated set of necessary trade-offs and 
accommodations to practical realities, such practices reflect a kind of 
Burkean equilibrium that makes radical reform inadvisable.23 The opposite 
also probably will sometimes be true. My present argument is only that 
clinicians ought to determine for themselves the extent to which each such 
situation exists. 
20. It may be objected that critique also presupposes skill. and that a circle is the appropriate 
metaphor to describe the logical relationship between skills training and critique. Further, 
if this is true a claim that one process presupposes the other is nothing more than a claim 
about where one has broken in on a circle. This objection may be granted without 
conceding that critique is still the appropriate place to break in. A sufficiently clever mind 
can produce ground breaking analysis of processes not yet mastered, but masterful 
performance is rarely possible without a critical if in part inarticulate overview. Critique 
also lends itself more easily to self-contained study. A rich critical theory helps answer 
many of the questions it raises, but determining what is skillful in even a rudimentary way 
is not possible without resort to critical analysis. And, more damage is done in clinical 
work, both to clients and self, by students long on natural skill and short on understanding 
than by their opposites. Each of these reasons suggests that critique is the place to begin. 
21. For a preliminary discussion of this issue see Condlin, supra note 8, at 133-35. See also 
William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469,504 (1984) 
(even common sense practical judgments and compromises presuppose theories about the 
way the society is structured and what it permits). 
22. I describe one such set of improvements in Condlin, supra note 8, 126-35. 
23. See David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in The Good Lawyer, supra note I, at 110-
11 (descripuon of a "Burkean" argument). 
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In the end, critique of lawyer practices is pursued for its contribution to 
the development of the individual-not to be unknowingly captive to 
received wisdom is to be more fully autonomous-because it is an essential 
element of a law trained person's completed world view, and as a 
foundation for reform of the incentive structures within which lawyer 
behavior operates. When it is present and done well, clinical instruction is 
successful and the simultaneous pursuit of other objectives makes the 
instruction that much better, but when it is absent, no amount of training in 
motor skill, socialization, or self-awareness can wag the dog. It is the only 
element of clinical study that is both a necessary and sufficient condition of 
good instruction.2~ 
II. Two Problems with the Conventional Clinic 
Two features of the conventional clinic inhibit effective critique. I shall 
discuss the first as a problem of design, and the second as a problem of 
resources. 
A. Design 
The conventional clinic purports to be both law school and law office, 
and its supervising attorneys both law teachers and lawyers, who both 
produce data and evaluate it. These dimensions cross-pollinate, clinicians 
claim, to create in the clinic the best of both worlds, a critical practice and 
an informed and relevant critique. Perhaps this is correct and certainly it is 
worth exploring, but there are reasons for dividing the labor of lawyering 
from the labor of critique that arguments for the conventional clinic do not 
take into account. 
To begin with, to conceive of a clinical teacher as both lawyer and 
professor, or as both data and critic, is to build into the role a conflict of 
interest.25 There is an emotional stake in a personal work product that 
makes it difficult to see weaknesses let alone criticize them with others, 
particularly when one is viewed as an "expert" and not expected to make 
mistakes. In evaluating his own efforts a clinical teacher will pull analytical 
24. Making critique the preeminent objective has several practical implications for the manner 
in which practice courses are typically thought about and taught. I! is not important for 
critique, for example, that students perform lawyer skill practices with great frequency. It is 
enough that they see particular practices performed and do them themselves a few times 
until the elements and the steps necessary 10 their mastery are evident. At that point. lime is 
usually better spent dissecting the practices for their essential properties. comparing them 
with alternatives, and evaluating their role in producing just outcomes. The critical 
clinical student is more of (though not completely) an anthropologist than a native. He 
becomes pan of the lawyer·society, but also maintains enough emotional and intelleClual 
distance 10 allow him 10 analyze that society's practices for their political and moral biases. 
presuppositions, and effects. He tries to understand why things are done as they are and 
enlarge his sense of what could be done, rather than internalize as habit what is commonly 
accepted. 
25. Il is also 10 define the rc!e as encompassing two full-time jobs, and virtually 10 guarantee 
that neither will be performed al the level of excellence. Such a conception programs 
clinicians 10 fail. and ought 10 be rejected (especially by clinical teachers) for this if for no 
other reason. 
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punches, no matter how large his reservoir of earnestness and good will, and 
be oblivious to this fact.26 If I am paternalistic in my relations with clients, 
for example, and evidence this by shielding them from unpleasant 
information, either by withholding it or presenting it in its "best" (i.e., 
inaccurate) light, but paternalism is not consistent with my image of myself 
or my conception of good lawyering, the insight that I am paternalistic is 
one I typically would screen out. Either I would not notice the behavior 
manifesting this pattern, or I would interpret it as showing concern for the 
client. Yet to teach from the behavior I would have to recognize and 
acknowledge the paternalism. Otherwise, I would teach about the wrong 
issue, and perhaps fail to understand the issue at all. 
The negative effect of this screening process on student learning is often 
extreme. Not only will clinical teachers miss problematic patterns in their 
practice behavior, but they will miss patterns likely to be the most 
educationally interesting because they are also likely to be the most 
threatening. In an ideal world this would not happen. There, a clinician 
would be as critical of his own work as that of others, and most accounts of 
clinical study assume this ideal. But experience teaches that this is an 
optimistic assumption most of the time because it does not take into account 
the finely developed mechanisms all of us possess to shield ourselves from 
information about how far we have fallen short. We may listen to such 
information under the right conditions, but it is the rare one among us who 
is willing or able to be the messenger at the same time.27 This is not 
pathological. Defenses are adaptive mechanisms that perform necessary 
functions in life. But one thing they do not do is allow one to know oneself 
by oneself. · 
To this it might be argued that in the conventional clinic the student's 
work is criticized and not the professor's. As a description of what typically 
occurs this is no doubt true, but as a claim about what ought to occur it is 
not. Practice instruction is the study of lawyer behavior and in this study 
student behavior is a small and often not very interesting part. Behavior of 
experienced and skilled lawyers, even if only a little more experience and 
skilled, must be added to the hopper if the study is to prove comprehensive 
and rich, and the supervising attorney's behavior is the logical candidate.2a 
Clinical teachers can suppress discussion of their own efforts, of course, and 
many do, but at the cost of greatly restricting the scope and sophistication of 
their study. 
It also is difficult in a clinical setting to separate student from supervisor 
work. Student decisions typically are reviewed in advance and students 
believe teachers have ratified important strategic choices before actions 
26. Ferren, supra note 5, at 118-20. 
27. Clinical participams who engage successfully in the critique of ideology (see not<.' 13 supra) 
are a limited exception to this claim. This is a small group (if it exists at all), howevt"r, and 
even it should participate in the conventional dink only after having mmplelt~d all other 
parts of the full clinical sequence. 
28. See Condlin, Moral Failure. supra nott• I, at :!22-25. for a discus~ion o£ the importance ol 
teacher behavior 10 prartin· instrunion. 
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affecting client interests are taken. Students say as much in after-the-fact 
discussions if the teacher is critical ("you told me it was all right," or "why 
didn't you tell me not to do it"). These are legitimate protests. Protecting 
client imerests is more important than allowing students to learn from 
mistakes and when student choices jeopardize such interests it is 
irresponsible for teachers not to intervene. When teachers are implicated in 
even this secondary sense, as all conventional clinicians are. their defenses 
are likely to be mobilized and their analytical punches are likely to be 
pulled. At a minimum, valuable time will be wasted resolving the not very 
important question of whether the teacher said that the choice was all right. 
Clinical students should review work in advance-! do not suggest the 
opposite-but postperformance analysis is likely to be more probing if the 
professor is not already on record (even arguably) as having approved of the 
work.29 
Clinical students are not good critics of their professors· work because 
students and professors are not true colleagues within the social and 
political structure of law school. The two groups have different levels of 
experience, status, perspective. and formal authority, and in each of these 
categories teachers have the upper hand, and often use it to suppress 
nonconforming views.3° Clinicians sometimes pretend that they are no 
different from their students, but this usually appears patronizing or silly, 
and is the opposite of what the students bargained for in paying tuition. 
When clinicians report that students are effective critics, it is usually because 
they (the clinicians) have a unduly narrow sense of what can be said about 
their work, or because the student has learned what the professor would like 
to hear.31 
29. These problems could possibly be reduced b¥ assigning students to two clinical teachers. 
one to supervise skill performance and the other critique, but it is nearly as difficult to 
analyze the work of a close colleague as that o£ one's self. Multiple supervisors are also 
expensive, particularly in comparison with the outside attorney option described in section 
III, and should be avoided when possible £or this reason alone. It is not just that two 
salaries cost more than one, but that money spent £or the extra salary will be used to 
duplicate something that already exists. In instances where the conventional clinic is the 
pedagogical format of choice, dual supervision is preferred. See infra 24-25. 
30. See Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes, supra note I, at 248-74 (dominant pattern in clinical 
supervision is one o£ teacher manipulation and control, even when ostensibly the 
opposite). In part, this is because practice instruction typically comes at the beginning 
rather than end of a student's clinical study, before he has had an opportunity to develop 
coherent views about lawyer practices or a vocabulary within which to discuss those views 
with another. A sequence of prerequisites would lessen this problem. See note 6 supra. I 
once claimed that the shared law-practice world of the clinic gave students confidence. 
knowledge, and critical perspective, and that these in turn increased student scrutiny o£ 
teacher pronouncement. See Condlin, Moral Failure. supra note I, at 322. I now bt>lieve 
that claim to be overstated. See also Alan A. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch. 85 Harv. 
L. Rev. 392, 412 (1971), for a description of student conversational styles when speaking 
with faculty. While many o£ the insights o£ Stone's important article are dated, its analysis 
of the student deferential style remains accurate. 
31. To establish a truly nonhierarchical relationship, Simon has suggested that it is the 
responsibility of a teacher to "create [a student) capable of holding [the teacher] 
accountable." See Simon. supra note 21. at -189. (Simon discusses lawver-clit•nt relations, 
but the extrapolation to u·acher-student seems fair and is on<' I sus pen he would be willing 
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Additionally, when the attorney and professor are one and the same there 
is increased pressure to avoid critique. For example, an attorney/professor 
often will want to use clients for instructional ends when the needs of the 
client conflict, usually in the interest of student education rather than out of 
a disrespect for client autonomy. (The opposite problem can occur as well. 
A clinician who sees himself more as an attorney than professor may want to 
use students to perform routine representational tasks with little or no 
instructional benefit.) Thus, he might schedule extra discovery, hearings on 
motions, bargaining sessions, or the like so that students can try their hands 
at prized but infrequent tasks. Sometimes such procedures benefit clients, 
and other times they do not, but they are always costly, even to those who do 
not pay their lawyers (e.g., delay, extended uncertainty, unpleasantness), 
and the decision of whether the game is worth the candle is for the client to 
make based on client considerations. Since the student and attorney; 
professor describe the choices that must be made, and provide much of the 
information on which such decisions are based, the potential for loading the 
deck in the direction of educational ends is high.32 And because the same 
persons are also responsible for detecting self-interested action after the fact, 
the likelihood of discovery is low. 
Lawyer-client conflicts occur in all practice settings, of course, but they 
are particularly pronounced in the monopoly conditions experienced by 
most clinics. Poor persons will not want to jeopardize their chance for legal 
redress by seeming "uncooperative" or "ungrateful,'' and will be susceptible 
to "suggestions" or "hints" that additional work needs to be done. A 
to make.) This is eilhc!r the student·and·teacher·are·equivalent view slightly dressed up, or 
a conception of expert-layperson relationships that makes conventional hierarchical 
thinking look like leveling. On this second and more interesting reading, teachers (or 
lawyers) not only are more powerful than students (or clients), they are so much more 
powerful that, godlike, they are able, even obliged, to "create" students in their own image 
and likeness. Yet, from the students' perspective. if il is difficult to deal with the 
conventional authoritarian bureaucrat, think of how much more difficult il would be to 
deal with God, or for that matter anyone unilaterally responsible for creating the 
possibility of my bilateral participation. This may read too much into Simon's view, but I 
doubt it. Few people are as facile with words as Simon. or choose them as carefully, and the 
religious perspective is consistent with his overall orientation. (See Simon, supra note 21, at 
506.) Surprisingly Simon seems to think of his approach as egalitarian, and one in which 
law teachers (or lawyers) will not dominate. Like other Critical Legal Theorists (see e.g., 
Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic against 
the System [Cambridge, Mass .• 1983]), Simon seems phobic about hierarchies. and acts as i£ 
the overriding goal in life was to stamp them out. Since hierarchies have a nasty habit of 
not going away, this causes him to produce fanciful mystifications about the absence of 
hierarchy as a prelude to its reintroduction under the guise of nonhierarchy. (How is it 
possible, for example, even to describe a nonhierarchical relationship from the perspective 
of only one person. as Simon tries to do, particularly the person already dominant.) There 
are oppressive hierarchies in life and they should be destroyed, but to acknowledge this is 
not to say that hierarchy itself must go. Some hierarchies, both natural and artificially 
constructed, produce more benefits than costs and ought to be retained. In the end, the 
abuse of hierarchy, not its existence, is the problem in life, and practical suggestions about 
keeping hierarchy in check are needed from thinkers as thoughtful as Simon. 
32. For an illustration of the low visibility and indirect manner in which a clinical mulrm, 
with the best of intentions. can load the deck in favor of student ends. see Condlin. Sorratt•s" 
New Clothes, supra note 1, at276-77 note 12. 
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genuine desire to avoid controlling the choice on the part of the clinician 
does not make this risk any less real. In fact, because his motives are noble he 
may be less likely to be on special guard to detect self-interested action, 
though no less likely to engage in it, or to have interests different from those 
of his client.33 And a clinic, because it is large and relatively undisciplined, 
may be less able to monitor closely all the interactions in which such 
problems are likely to arise. This is a variation on a familiar point, 
discussed in the early clinical literature as the conflict between service and 
education, and dismissed there by the assertion that work generated for 
educational purposes invariably improved the quality of the client's 
representation.34 The argument was powerful at the time because the way in 
which clinical practitioner interests could differ from those of their clients 
or clients could wish to avoid procedures that provided instrumental 
benefits was not widely apparent. Now it is evident that the argument is too 
simple. 
This conflict between service and education is exacerbated by limitations 
of time. In even a moderately busy clinic, preparation of client cases must 
receive the highest priority, looked at from the perspective of both lawyer 
and teacher (because giving client interests the highest priority is itself an 
important teaching message), and preparing cases thoroughly, as a law 
school clinic should, will expand to fill the available time. This priority is 
reflected in all aspects of the clinic's operation, but is perhaps most 
apparent in the patterns that appear in conversations between teachers and 
students. Most of these conversations consist of requests by students for 
information to fill gaps in their experience, or to help them make strategic 
judgments in their cases (what do I do next? where do I find a form for 
that?), and clinical teacher responses that answer these requests. The 
underlying assumptions are that there are set ways, known to experts, of 
performing lawyer tasks, and that a novice's best course is to ask an expert 
about them. Since few clinical teachers espouse these assumptions, it is 
ironic that in answering student questions they convey the opposite 
message.35 Other discussion, often sophisticated, is about the manipulation 
of rules, procedures, and institutions for the purpo.se of gaining an 
instrumental advantage against an adversary. This "ends-means" thinking, 
as Anthony Amsterdam calls it,36 like any puzzle-solving,37 can be 
complicated and challenging, but it need not be critical political thinking, 
and usually it is not. The assumption in "puzzle solving" is that the 
33.Id. 
34. See e.g., Earl Johnson, Education versus Service: Three Variations on the Theme. in 
Clinical Education for the Law Student 414, 417-20 (Council on Legal Education £or 
Professional Responsibility, New York. 1973). 
35. See Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes, supra note I, at 248-74. £or a description o£ the manner 
in which patterns in teacher behavior convey instructional messages often at odds with the 
teacher's espoused theory. 
36. See Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 614. 
37. See Thomas S. Kuhn. The Structure o£ Scientific Revolutions 35-42 (Chicago. 1970), £or a 
discussion of "puzzle solving." 
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structure of the puzzle is legitimate, so much so that awareness of the 
underlying question of legitimacy recedes into unconsciousness. 
The foregoing is what one would expect of law office conversation. It is 
reasonable for students. as novices, to be preoccupied with impending 
instrumental tasks, particularly if client interests are at stake, the tasks are 
unfamiliar, and the students' role is defined as performing them 
successfully. The first objective in any environment is survival (though 
students do not always appreciate that this represents relative rather than 
absolute success). And it is only slightly less understandable that clinicians, 
as supervising lawyers, would answer student questions to prevent client 
interests from being sacrificed, office resources from being wasted, and 
student effort from coming to a standstill. This illustrates not so much the 
failure of individual clinical teachers and students as the inadequacy of the 
metaphor of the teaching law office. Law offices represent rather than teach, 
and when they try to do both it is the teaching that suffers, as it should. 
Clinical participants will usually be satisfied with using legal rules and 
institutions cleverly on behalf of disadvantaged groups (a good thing in 
itself), and accept rather than criticize the premises of the system they so 
skillfully manipulate.38 In a world where real client interests are in 
jeopardy, obligations are numerous and pressing, and time is limited, 
understanding for understanding's sake will not be given a high priority, 
and reasonably so.39 In such a world questions about the justice of 
individual outcomes will sometimes be examined, though often only 
implicitly, but questions about the justice of systemic or institutional 
arrangements or standard practice methodologies will usually go begging. 
Ends-means thinking makes it difficult to see the forest for the trees and 
undercuts a lawyer's capacity for utopian thinking, an attribute one 
ordinarily would think desirable in a social engineer.40 
The conflict-of-interest problem is built deeply into the structure of the 
conventional clinic. It is not a cosmetic defect or a failure of execution, and 
it is not going to go away on its own as clinics and clinicians mature. If 
anything, it will become more serious as clinical practice slips into the 
routinized patterns of day-to-day law practice generally, as it has in many 
38. See Walter Gellhom, Preaching That Old Time Religion, 63 Va. L. Rev. 175, 187 (1977) 
(clinical teachers devoted to sharpening the adversary fang and claw); Charles R. Halpern&: 
John M. Cunningham, Reflections on the New Public Interest Law, 59 Geo. L.J. 1095, 
1109 (1971) (public interest lawyers, while they otherwise test the law's bounds, profess a 
basic commitment "to the adversary system itself.") 
39. The problem may be more serious than lack of time. Lawyer thinking differs radically from 
critical reflection. It starts from a narrower focus, looks at evidence from a more 
instrumental perspective, and is more manipulative in the manner it thinks of and 
expresses its conclusions. In a sense. legal and critical thinking are the work of different 
people, and a shift from one perspective to the other is a shift in personas. Most of us do not 
embody two such equally developed personas, and as a result, would find such a shift 
difficult to make. 
40. See Robert Gordon, Of Law and the River, and Of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. 
Legal Educ. I, 8 (1985), where he faults minimalist stoic morality (professionalism) for not 
dealing with the "real world" of law practice because it gives no guidance on what lawyers 
ought to do; it cannot imagine alternatives to the status quo and does not think it should. 
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places. Even exceptionally able teachers, who are genuinely interested -in 
critique, will find it difficult to pursue that process in such an environment 
and this brings us to the second problem. A disproportionate number of 
clinical teachers seem uninterested in critique, so much so that even if the 
problem of design were corrected, critique would not necessarily become the 
central objective of the conventional clinic. This is the problem of resources . 
• 
B. Resources 
Clinical teachers see>m to view prevailing methods for performing lawyer 
practices as received wisdom rather than data. and measure success more by 
how students imitate these Im!thods than by how they analyze them. This is 
evident, not just in the design of the clinic. where clinicians have created a 
world in which critique is almost impossible. but in the absence of critical 
interests manifest in the scholarly clinical literature. Most clinical articles 
describe how students learn that practicing law requires skills beyond being 
able to read a case closely, and different examples are given:11 This is not a 
startling discovery, however, and it is made with equal facility by students 
who have not had the benefit of a clinical course. A second category of 
articles, often interesting and clever. catalogues and refines lawyer tactical 
tricks.42 But these articles consist of "puzzle solving," and do not so much 
establish the critical dimension as presume it. There are a few critical 
clinical articles,43 but they comprise a regrettably small group that seems 
more an aberration th.an a harbinger of things to come. 
41. See e.g., William Pincus. The Clinical Component in University Professional Education. in 
Clinical Education for the Law Student, ed. William Pincus, 139-51 (New York. 1980). 
42. See e.g., Michael Meltsner &: Philip G. Schrag, Public Interest Advocacy: Materials for 
Clinical Legal Education ch. 13 (Boston. 1974): Mark K. Schoenfeld. Strategies and 
Techniques for Successful Negotiation, 69 A.B.A. J. 1226 (1983). 
43. Such articles include Carrie Menkel-Meadow's Problem Solving Negotiation, challenging 
prevailing adversarial conceptions of lawyer bargaining (see Menkel-Meadow. supra note 
15); Simon's Homo Psychologicus, detailing the lack of a politics in the psychological 
vision of lawyering underlying clinical education (see Simon. supra note 14): Bellow's 
discussion of paternalism, lack of imagination, and lawyer self-interest imbedded in legal 
services offices' standardized methods of representing the poor (see Gary Bellow, Turning 
Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience. 34 NLADA Briefcase 106 (1977); and 
Schrag's, Bleak House, describing abusive uses of the civil discovery process by the 
collection industry (see Philip G. Schrag, Bleak House 1968: A Report on Consumer Test 
Litigation, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 115 (1969). (See also Tushnet, supra note 5. at 278. and 
articles cited therein at notes 12-15.) This group of articles has produced surprisingly little 
discussion by clinical teachers. A few nonclinical teachers have joined issue (see e.g .. james 
R. Elkins, All My Friends are Becoming Strangers: The Psychological Perspective in Legal 
Education, 84 W. Va. L. Rev. 161 ( 1981) replying to Simon): but these are clinical subjects 
and one would expect clinical teachers to have important contributions to make. Simon's 
strong accusations, at a minimum. should have provoked a reply and a debate clarifving 
whether clinical instruction has a politics, but this has not happened. (But see Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 5, at 565 note 61. clinical teacher response to Simon in a footnote.) 
Some will see this a~sessment as overly pessimistic. They believe that clinical scholarship 
has begun to mature. or more accurately, has "passed beyond infancy into adolescence." 
See, Call for Papers, Brochure of International Conference on Exploring and Expanding 
the Content of Clinical Legal Education and Scholarship. Fall 1985 (U.C.L.A. and 
University of Warwick Schools of Law). If this was intended as a compliment (twenty years 
is a long infancy), and there is every reason to believe that it was. the written record as yet 
does not support it. 
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Some might argue that the criticisms of substantive law implicit in 
clinical education's decision to represent poor people, and explicit in legal 
arguments made in briefs and memoranda filed in particular cases, fulfill 
the obligation of critique. But beyond the fact that most brief writing is not 
critique,44 this claim fails because clinical teachers were not hired as 
commentators on substantive social welfare law schemes. Their subject was 
thought to be lawyer practices (if one thought about it), and ultimatel'y, they 
were expected to ask whether existing methods for performing such 
practices produce more or less justice. The substance/procedure distinction 
ultimately collapses, and some substantive law criticism is an inevitable 
outgrowth of clinical study. But using lawyer practices for under-
represented groups is not the same as analyzing those practices for their 
contribution to a just legal system, or conceiving of better ways to structure 
that system, and only the latter are the sine qua non of clinical study. 
There is a second, contingen~ dimension to the resource problem, one 
grounded ironically in clinical teachers' own mistaken premises. If skills 
training (rather than critique) is viewed as the preeminent clinical objective, 
most existing programs would still fail, this time because clinical teachers 
are not typically the best exemplars of law practice skills. 45 Medical 
. One hesitates to raise the problem of the lack of critical clinical scholarship. It is not a 
cordial point, some even think it is an impolite one, and such points have a way of being 
ignored irrespective of their merits. But there is not much critical clinical literature and this 
is a serious cause for concern. One looks in vain at the history of legal education for a 
successful reform not grounded principally in a revisionist theory about law, legal systems. 
or institutions. Reform of education is first and foremost reform of ways of thinking about 
subject matter, manifest in scholarship. Changes in methods of instruction are cosmetic not 
substantive, based more on aesthetic than political concerns, and usually only as viable as 
the power of the group instituting them is strong. Such changes rarely survive their 
sponsors, or their sponsors' current interests. Like reformers before them, from the law-as· 
science advocates of the late nineteenth century, to the critical legal studies theorists of the 
late twentieth, clinical teachers must say something new, in print, about the fairness, 
legitimacy, and nature of law and the legal system. The special vantage point of lawyer 
practices makes this possible, but does not guarantee that it will happen. 
44. A few clinical teachers argue that briefs should count as critical scholarly output, but this 
claim is based on a misunderstanding of critical scholarship. But see Tushnet, supra note 5, 
at 277 note II ("Legal briefs are not, by definition, inadequate evidence of scholarly 
insight"; (emphasis added). Critical scholarship does not start from the perspective of a 
client's instrumental ends, articulate only arguments supporting those ends (and rebuttals 
to counterarguments necessary to establish credibility), or try to camou!lage its biases, 
weaknesses and strategic omissions rhetorically by the use of argumentative technique. 
Some scholars work in this way, but their work is thought to be suspect for those reasons. 
By the time a scholar writes he usually knows how he will conclude, but he did not start 
with this knowledge in hand, and his views will have changed many times over before 
reaching reflective equilibrium. The key difference between the two processes is that in 
critical scholarship the author decides for himself the outcome of the analysis; in brief 
writing he does not. Brief writing often contributes new insights to the understanding of a 
problem, such is the force of self-interested and narrowly focused thought, but rarely if ever 
does it alter basic c-onceptions of the way in which the problem should be understood. 
45. While it is difficult to establish the best skill exemplars, it is fair to say that as a group 
clinical teachers (1) were not the best performers in law school, (2) are young and 
inexperienced in comparison with the bar as a whole, (3) do not work in elite law firms or 
with anything approximating such firms' facilities or resources, and (4) because they work 
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clinicians are a good analogy. They are elite practitioners, at the top of their 
fields, and their appointments as clinicians acknowledge this stature rather 
than auempt to confer it. Although clinical work does not always have the 
highest status, in medicine only the best practitioners become clinicians. If 
clinical skills are to be learned by imitation, the medical view seems to hold, 
those being imitated should exemplify the best skill performance the 
profession has to offer. One would expect law schools to use equivalent 
exemplars, experienced lawyers who have established themselves as 
foremost among their peers at the ;)erformance of lawyer skills. Yet, few 
legal clinicians are elite practitioners or in any other way the equivalent in 
stature, competence, or sophistication of their medical counterparts. 
Clinical teachers counter that while not always the best at using lawyer 
skills they are the best at teaching about (i.e., transmitting) them: that they 
make up· in pedagogical effectiveness what they lack in experience and 
proficiency.~6 This argument has initial appeal. but in the end it concedes 
too much. If a clinician has not performed the skills under study at or near 
the highest levels, he cannot transmit any interesting understanding of 
those skills. This is the premise of clinical education. that experience is a 
necessary component of understanding. He may transmit what he 
understands well, but this will provide only a misleadingly simple 
conception of the skill, and may unwittingly convince students that there is 
no more to be learned. A similar lack of experience does not disable a 
clinician interested in critique b~cause he does not seek to transmit skills 
and thus need not have mastered them. In fact, his critical bite is often 
sharper when he is "inexperienced" with the skills and thus not fully 
socialized into prevailing practices and modes of thought. 
Neither variation of the problem of resources is likely to go away. Elite 
practitioners will not become clinical teachers because it would cost them 
with novices on relatively simple cases (usually by pedagogical choice) are not likely to be 
on the frontiers of new skill developments. There are exceptions to each of these 
generalizations, and good arguments that the criteria implicit in them do not measure skill 
proficiency accurately. But for most law trained people who do not start out determined to 
believe the opposite, I suspect that the above factors establish a fairly powerful 
circumstantial case against the claim that clinical teachers are the best skill exemplars. For 
attempts at the difCicult task of rank ordering ("stratifying·· would be their word) the bar. 
see John Heinz & Edward 0. Laumann. Chicago Lawyers: The Social Stnu:ture of the Bar 
(New York, 1982): Francis Kahn Zemans & Victor Rosenblum, The Making of a Public 
Profession (Chicago, 1978). 
46. If clinicians are willing to sus pen.~ the "experience .. requiremem for themselves in this one 
instance. why not for other people in other instances? Why not agree that a person with no 
experience. either with the skills in question or law practice in general. who is suHiciently 
smart and asks interesting questions, can be as good a clinical teacher as one who has 
mastered the skills in their most sophisticated variations? For example, why not Roberto 
Unger in the clinic? On this article's view such an idea makes 3cnse, but to accept it. even in 
part, is to reject conventional clinical thinking. One would think that clinical teachers 
would be eager to give up the no-win claim to skill expertise. Most smdcnts understa11d 
from summer and part-time work that clinicians are not the best practitiom•rs. and 
traditional faculty do not believe that law teachers who ground their imellcctual authoritv 
on skill expertise arc thoughtful. Even as a strategic matter. it is hard to imagine why 
clinicians would cling to such a position. 
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too much. They will not view the opportunity to do research and produce 
scholarship as a form of compensation. Nor will they, as do their medical 
counterparts, be able to generate large fees on the basis of their clinical 
work. They will want to be compensated within the salary structure of the 
bar, however, and this means larger salaries than law schools are capable of 
paying. Moreover, existing clinical teachers are not likely to shift their 
emphasis from training to critique because they do not want to. and might 
find it difficult to do so if they did. If critique was their highest value 
clinicians would have behaved differently from the start. They would have 
developed the intellectual content of the clinical subject in the journals, 
provided additional room in the structure of the conventional clinic for 
reflection on policy questions only tangentially related to skills or the 
instrumental tasks of particular cases, and would not have used fieldwork to 
carry the brunt of clinical instruction. In addition, having established the 
clinic as a practicing law office, clinicians have now created legitimate 
expectations in client groups (or at least sincerely and reasonably believe 
that they have), that cannot be repudiated unilaterally or easily, either in the 
short run to redesign programs or permanently to devote more attention to 
questions of critique. 
The conventional clinic is often described by students as a haven from the 
harsh world of law practice, where one gets a last chance to live according to 
ideals. This view (i.e., that ideals play no part in traditional law practice) is 
arrogant, coming from persons with little or no experience with practice in 
the conventional sense, and dangerous (because it reflects a resignation to 
the mundane yet changeable features of regular law practice which must 
eventually be confronted). But most important, even if correct, it is a 
questionable premise on which to base an educational program. The safe-
haven concept was tested in the T-group-an experiment of organizational 
psychology to help managers learn to produce more open organizations-
with mixed and short-lived results. Laboratory training, as it was also 
known, developed skill at behaving competently in laboratories, but was 
not so successful at transferring learning "back home" to work. 47 Law 
schools should think carefully before they replicate this result by 
resuscitating the T-group and making it a permanent part of the law school 
curriculum. 
Students should learn about lawyer practices, to be sure, but in a setting 
that represents the one in which those practices are typically carried on. 
47. See Fritz Steele. Consulting for Organizational Change 60-82 (Amherst, Mass., 1975) 
(characteristics and limitations of laboratory training); Donald N. Michael, On Learning 
to Plan-And Planning to Learn 225-64 (San Francisco, 1973) (description of structural 
features of conventional social organizations, not present in T·groups that resist learning); 
William R. Torbert. Learning from Experience toward Consciousness 45, 166 (New York, 
1972) (limitations ofT-group learning); Chris Argyris, Intervention Theory and Method: A 
Behavioral Science View 52-55 (Reading, Mass., 1970) (individuals learn to be competent in 
T-groups but not to create more open and trusting worlds "back home" in work); Leland 
P. Bradford, jack R. Gibb & Kenneth D. Benne, T-group Theory and Laboratory Method: 
Innovation in Re-education (New York, I964) (enthusiastic description of the potential of 
the T-group learning). 
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This means existing law offices and not hybrid variations specially created 
for the occasion. Protection against being overwhelmed by the vocationalism 
of the law office milieu or its concomitant pressure to turn intellectual 
analysis platitudinous or instrumental should come from a law professor 
who intervenes when these dangers threaten. Trustworthy data about 
student performance48 and access to mentors with critical agendas are the 
only essential features of good practice instruction, and most of the time 
these will be easier to produce in a format other than the conventional 
clinic.49 
III. The Cooperating Outside Office Alternative 
Practice instruction could be based in cooperating local law offices of all 
types both public and private, so without any loss and potentially some gain 
in intellectual sophistication and critical perspective. A student would work 
on cases or projects pending in an outside office and in every respect fit into 
the office's customary ways of doing things. He would take his primary skill 
direction from an outside attorney, whose principal concern would be with 
the technical quality of the student's work. The attorney would assign tasks. 
edit written work, enforce deadlines, evaluate skill performances. and 
otherwise be the final supervisory authority with respect to all efforts on 
behalf of the client. In addition to his supervision by the outside· attorney. 
the student also would meet with a clinical professor in a regular!!· 
scheduled tutorial to discuss the policy questions implicit in the student's 
practice. Tutorials make it easier than seminar meetings to preserve client 
48. The most common example is a transcript of the relevant portions nl an audio-tape: 
recording of the performance under study. A text is important. Analning pc:rlonnamt• on 
the basis of shared memory or oral reconstructions is roughly akin to analyzing donrinc: on 
the basis of eyewitness accounts of a reading of a judicial opinion. It rnay be possible. but 
no one would ever try to do it. 
49. Some students inevitably will work for Jaw firms in which skills training is poor or 
nonexistent. and law schools are right to be worried about this. But it does not follow that a 
clinical course is the place to remedy this problem. More informed placement counseling 
and better continuing legal education programs are more logic-.1l responses. A school 
should define a clinical course's purposes positively in terms of what it can add to a 
studenfs critical understanding of the legal system. rather than reactively in response to 
worst-case scenarios about new-lawyer work experiences. A course must have educational 
integrity. and for clinical courses that integrity is found in a critical appraisal of lawvc:r 
practices and the relationship of those practices to justice. 
Additionally, some argue that law schools ought to run clinics as state-of-the-an law firms 
where students work with the latest technology and are introduced to up to date theorit·~ of 
law oHice management. Most schools could not aHord to do this. and if thev could tht•v 
should not want to. Concern with technology and management is at otKt'rtl with form O\'t·r 
substance. The interesting things about law practice are legal not technological. and a law 
professor's most important contribution to a studenfs learning is in the realm of ideas 
about law. Technology and management can be interesting adjuncts to that studv. but tht•v 
cannot replace it. 
50. These could include private law firms. legal services nHices. public interest organiLations. 
legislative and municipal law departments. attorneys-general o£fices. administrati\·c: 
agencies. courts. or any other type of oHice engaged in legal work about which a ( linical 
program could want to teach. I have used the outside oHice format. as described here. for 
several years in my own clinical teaching, and the following discussion is based on that 
experience. 
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confidences,st and can be held at fixed times because the professor and 
students are not tied to the schedule of the clients' cases. 
An example will help illustrate the differences between the attorney and 
professor supervisory agendas.52 Assume that a student encounters the 
following problem:53 A landlord has started eviction proceedings against a 
client of the student's firm for damaging a rental premises. One of the items 
of damage is a broken front door window. The client tells the student that 
he knows a passerby threw a snowball through the window because he 
found a puddle of water in the front hall next to the broken glass. The 
student is suspicious because it has not snowed in the vicinity yet that year 
(it is November and the interview takes place in southern New England). 
Assume also that the client is unfriendly, equivocating, and generally 
reluctant to talk. The student believes, not implausibly, that the client broke 
the window himself and is lying about the snowball to cover this up. 
Possibly being lied to makes the student angry because he believes that it 
shows him little respect, and fearful because he thinks it will make him look 
like a novice when he presents the story to a supervisor. He brings these and 
other issues to his meetings with both the outside attorney and the clinical 
professor. 
The attorney would be interested principally in obtaining information 
necessary to put the client's story in its best light as a defense, or, if the 
evidence did not warrant a defense, to persuade the client to concede on the 
issue of the broken window. As a first step, he would probably identify 
maneuvers that could be used to test the client's story. These might include 
obtaining factual information from sources independent of the client that 
would make the story more or less plausible (e.g., local weather bureau 
snowfall and temperature records); informing the client of the attorney-
client privilege and assuring him that incriminating information would not 
be revealed without consent; restating the story,pointing out problematic 
areas, and asking the client for further explanation or proof; cross-
examining the client to demonstrate how the story might be shown in court 
to be implausible; accusing the client of lying and demanding that he deal 
honestly; or whatever else came to mind. Testing the story without 
rupturing the attorney-client relationship would be a difficult task, calling 
for intellectual inventiveness and practical expertise, but a task the student 
must learn to perform. 
The clinical professor would have a different yet complementary set of 
objectives. These might include exploring out-of-the-ordinary instrumental 
51. See Confidential Communications in Student Legal Clinics, 1972 Law &: Social Order 668 
(1972) (description of the difficulties in preserving client confidences in law school clinics). 
52. For an illustration of the differences between thinking like a lawyer and thinking like a 
critic, see Jon 0. Newmfln. Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 
Yale LJ. 1643 (1985). Judge Newman's suggestions are the type of ideas which critically 
inclined clinicals could be expected to generate and test. Yet a reading of his proposals will 
show just how sharply they contrast with the typical clinician's substantive agenda. 
53. This example is real and comes from my own clinical supervision, but its generic features 
are so commonplace that any clinical teacher could offer an equivalent substitute. Several 
have told me that they have supervised the same case. 
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resolutions to the problem which had not occurred to the attorney or had 
occurred and seemed unpromising;s• or what is more likely, using the 
client's behavior as a vehicle for examining the epistemological and moral 
difficulties inherent in the process of reconstructing historical fact in 
adversarial adjudication. For example, the professor might probe the 
concept of "lying" to determine whether it explains all of the client's 
actions or the student's worries; question whether structural features of the 
attorney-client relationship encourage or provoke such behavior; ask what 
obligations a lawyer owes to one who has not communicated events 
accurately; try to define the nature of truth telling in a system of stylized 
discourse or lying games; consider whether tactics for "testing" the story 
raise new problems, such as invasion of client privacy or lack of respect for 
client autonomy; examine the role a harsh law, sympathetic client, or 
hostile adversary plays in determining what to do; ask how else facts could 
be investigated and presented in dispute settlement so as to reduce the 
pressure for creating a "best light" story; or take up related questions. 55 The 
professor's inquiries might produce benefits for the client, but the decision 
to undertake them would not depend upon the guarantee of such a return 
nor would it ordinarily be expected. Both attorney and professor would take 
an agent-centered approach, in that each would attempt to develop 
understanding useful to the student while acting in lawyer role. The 
attorney would be interested in immediate returns, however, while the 
professor would take the longer view. 
It is easy to give other illustrations. Assume, for example, that a student 
participates in a negotiation in which an adverse attorney exploits his (the 
student's) low level of tolerance for conflict. The adversary makes ad 
hominem arguments, shouts, threatens, and otherwise abuses the student 
because he judges that the student will seek to end the confrontation more 
quickly ~md pay client money to do so (i.e., the student will flee rather than 
fight). Assume also, that with all of its costs both immediate and long-
range, on balance thjs is still the attorney's instrumentally best approach. It 
will achieve the highest dollar settlement, in the shortest period of time, 
with the smallest amount of expense, and with few if any long-range 
repercussions because the attorney will not negotiate with the student again. 
A supervising attorney would be interested in what the student could have 
done to prevent himself from being abused, while a professor might take up 
such questions as whether a settlement based on nonsubstantive 
considerations is politically legitimate or whether there are moral limits on 
the uses of leverage. 
54. See e.g., Saul W. Baerstein, Functional Relations between L"lw and Psychiatry-A Study of 
Characteristics Inherent in Professional Interaction. 23 J. Legal Educ. 399 (1971) 
(description of a psychiatric remedy to an ostensibly legal problem). 
55. These questions are eclectic in their intellectual perspectives and are meant only to suggest 
the range of critical avenues open to the clinician, not identify the precise questions that 
should be asked. For an illustration of a set of multiple questions, generated from a single 
analytical framework, that would be interesting to pursue in this context. see James B. 
White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Lift•. 52 l 1• 
Chi. L. R(•V. 684. 701-702 (1985). 
HeinOnline -- 36 J. Legal Educ. 66 1986
66 ] ournal of Legal Education 
Issues raised by the professor also will come up in attorney-student 
discussions, but because they are not closely connected with preparing the 
client's case thev are likely to be kept in the background. 56 The attorney and 
student might refer to the issues in passing, but the professor and student 
would_examine them in depth. The professor would suggest readings57 and 
the student would prepare texts (e.g., in the "snowball" case a transcript of 
the interview segment in which the student elicited the questionable parts of 
the story)58 on which analysis could be based, and these materials wou!d be 
distributed sufficiently in advance of a tutorial meeting to allow time for 
reflection and judgment. Since it would not be possible to investigate all 
important issues in such detail. represemative examples embodying 
recurring themes would be chosen. In the outside office format the attorney 
and professor complement one another in their approaches to the student's 
supervision. and together help the studem discover how instrumental and 
critical perspectives intertwine to make a complete frame of reference. 
One might ask why fieldwork is essential to the student-professor 
discussions. Could not the same analysis be done in the classroom, perhaps 
in a more sophisticated fashion, based on social science research data and 
scholarship about the profession? If one is interested in lawyer behavior in 
the aggregate, a sociology of the profession, then perhaps the answer is yes. 
Though even here there is benefit in discovering how patterns that are 
problematic in statistical aggregates or verbal descriptions do not always 
appear so when confronted in experience. But if one is interested in a moral 
philosophy of lawyering it is necessary to deal with these questions in the 
first person. Moral understanding is arrived at by critical reflection on 
56. This could be for personal as well as work concerns. The professor's questions may 
challenge the attorney's conception of role or his standard methods of performing lawyer 
tasks. The attorney is likely to filter out such interpretations because they are distracting 
under the best of conditions and threatening under the worst. The professor's t•mmional 
distance from the representation, and his critical rather than instrumental approat h to the 
interview, on the other hand, should increase the likelihood that these possibilities an• 
considered. 
57. In the "snowball" case these might include excerpts from Sissda Bok. Lying: Moral Choiu• 
in Public and Private LiCe (New York. 1978) (discussion o£ diCCiculties in dl'fining lying, 
particularly in stylized and role regulated relationships); Stuart Hampshire, cd .. Public and 
Private Morality (New York, 1978) (suggestion of argumem for lawyt·r control of diems, 
based on analogy to ends-focused morality of public oCCicials); john H. Langbein, 
Comparative Criminal Procedure (St. Paul, Minn., 1977) (description of alternative system5 
Cor reconstructing historical fact in dispute adjudication): Robert Traver. Anatom\' of a 
:\Iurder (New York, 1958) (illustration of the force of lawyer behavior in influencing diem 
communication); Luban, supra note 23 (criticism of fan reronstruction pron.•ss in 
adversary adjudication); Gerald j. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 
55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 63 (1980) (discussion of psychological diCCiculties created by behaving 
diCCeremly in professional and ordinary relationships); Simon, supra note 16 (proposed 
nonhierarchical conception of lawyer-client relatiomhip); Marvin E. Frankel, The Search 
Cor Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031 (1975) (discussion of proposed 
ethical rule requiring lawyers to pursue truth in adversary adjudication); Ric-hard 
Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Problems. 5 Hum. Rts. I ( 1975) 
(description of dominating and manipulative patterns in lawyer behavior with dit•nts ami 
analysi~ of moral propriety o£ such patterns), and tlw like. 
5R. A tt•xt b imponam. Se~ notl' ·18 supra. 
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activities that have been experienced pre-reflectively and begun to be 
internalized as dispositions. Until disposition is present, at least in some 
minimal or beginning form, the moral character of action cannot be fully 
understood. Without the experience of acting in lawyer role moral 
philosophizing will be just so many words. 59 
In addition, just as an anthropologist discovers aspects of a culture lost on 
a demographer, a clinical participant discovers aspects of lawyer behavior 
lost on a classroom observer. In participating in an event one discovers what 
drives it, and this is different from learning how to desGrib~ the event, even 
with a great deal of particularity. The professor's questions would have 
been asked in other law school courses. but for most students direct 
experience will add nuance and sophistication; and for some it will make 
the questions real for the first time. A lie is a more complicated 
phenomenon in person than in a hypothetical case, and the experience of 
perhaps being lied to stimulates additional insight into the nature and 
causes of such activity. It is often inconceivable to students that a 
misrepresentation could not be a lie, for example, or that someone they were 
trying to help could misrepresent to them, that they could unknowingly and 
with the best of intentions lead a client to misrepresent, that strong personal 
feelings could affect their level of effort, or that they would not probe deeply 
to discover truth if it would jeopardize other strategic objectives. Until they 
are involved in such events, students do not take seriously the possibility 
that the events could happ~n. or become aware of all the factors involved in 
understanding and dealing with them. 
Direct experience with lawyer role also causes practice instruction to take 
a firmer hold. This is not only because the richness of real life data makes 
the experience more memorable, but because students approach real 
problems with a heightened seriousness of purpose. Research on simulation 
gaming shows that students play at academic exercises in ways that 
circumscribe their learning. 60 Law school counteracts this phenomenon in 
the first year by making class activity lifelike (case analysis is performed in 
roughly the same manner as in law practice),61 and important (first year 
grades and the effects they produce place a ceiling on future work options), 
but once case analysis is mastered in at least a rudimentary sense, and class 
standing is established, there is no equivalent pressure in second- and third-
year courses, even though there are many subjects still to be understood. A 
teacher can be charismatic, or restrict enrollment to mature students, but 
putting students in real situations has similar effects and is more easily 
attained. As long as such programs are no more costly than their traditional 
counterparts, and the outside office program is not, there is no overriding 
objection to their use. This is not an argument for the pervasive use of 
59. See Condlin, Moral Failure, supra note I. at 323-24. for a discussion of this point. 
60. See e.g., Jeffrey Z. Rubin & Bert R. Brown, The Social Psychology of Bargaining and 
Negotiation 297-300 (New York, 1975), and discussions cited therein. 
61. See Condlin. Moral Failure. supra note I. at 340n. 15. 
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clinical fieldwork, only a few clinical subjects are taught best out of real 
cases, but for advanced seminars of the type described earlier.62 
Organizing a practice program dispersed throughout many offices might 
appear difficult logistically, but this is true only if one is concerned with 
using the offices to train students to master skills. If the goals are 
understanding and critique, a professor need not monitor student 
experience closely. A working familiarity with each student's law firm, an 
understanding of the customs of local practice. and the student's experience 
captured in some relatively accurate form (such as a text) would be enough. 
This data need only be evocative enough to recreate the relevant experience 
in the student's mind when it comes time for analysis. There would be no 
such thing as a ''teachable moment," lost to posterity if its meaning was not 
analyzed the instant it occurred. Critical reflection would occur whenever 
the student and professor could meet, and for several reasons it might be 
better if this happened well after the student's performance had taken place. 
This is an instance in which different instructional goals make for different 
logistical concerns. 
Periodically, compromises may have to be made in this format to 
accommodate structural features of law practice. Clients do not make 
themselves available for limited purposes, for example, quietly bowing out 
once a student has accumulated enough experience to sustain a period of 
critical reflection, and this is true whether one works in an outside office or 
a conventional clinic. But these compromises are kept to a minimum when 
the clinical professor and student are not solely or even principally 
responsible for the representation of the client. With a separate attorney 
protecting the client's interests no problem is created when instructional 
objectives require the clinical participants' attention elsewhere. This is a 
major advantage of the outside office format.63 
Lawyers will cooperate with an outside office program for several reasons. 
The largest number will help out of a desire to contribute to law student 
education. Lawyers are law students once removed, and most can remember 
when they too were novices and helped along by members of the profession. 
Others will value the opportunity to talk with someone who understands 
their problems and can give them a second (and third) opinion on their 
work. Graduates or friends of a school will help out of a sense of loyalty, 
while others will like the prestige that comes with being affiliated with a 
62. See note 6 supra. 
63. Not wanting to be embarrassed before one's peers and students cau~es (and should raust•) 
conventional clinicians to prepare cases compulsively. In doing so, however. they leave 
little time or energy for critical reflection. A sigh of relid is the typtc:al postperlurmanrc 
reaction, and searching discussion abour the improvement of performanre is of little 
interest at that moment to all but a few genuine saints (with high metabolism rates). (Many 
assert that they engage in searching postperformance critique, bm close examination 
usually shows their definitions of "searching" to be controversial.) Enrrgy n•tums, of 
course, but time does not, so that when interest in critique reemerges then• is more pressing 
work on other cases. If clinicians are to do worthwhile critique, at a minimum. tht•v must 
be freed from tht:' all-consuming burdens of public pt•rlormann· wlurh gn hand in hand 
with client representation. 
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university law school, or see students as free (or nearly free) resources with 
which to augment their client services. Having to make few adjustments in 
their day-to-day ways of doing things will make it easier for lawyers to 
accept such a program. Because the lawyers provide data more than 
instruction any of these motives is acceptable. 
The behavior of cooperating lawyers must be reasonably competent and 
the issues raised by their practice moderately complex if outside office work 
is to generate interesting critical insights. These requirements may cause 
difficulty for schools located in communities where the quality of practice is 
not high or the type of work not sophisticated, and in these circumstances 
operating a conventional clinic may be the wiser course. Sophisticated 
practice does not inevitably mean antitrust or First Amendment work, 
however. or cases not likely to be found in small- to medium-sized cities. 
Cases can be interpersonally rich even when doctrinally simple. particularly 
when examined through the prism of a well-developed conceptual 
framework, and interpersonal skill is found in small communities as well as 
large. In fact. increased access to skill exemplars and a less-pressured pace in 
which to discuss issues can make the small community preferable much of 
the time.64 Clinicians argue that practitioners cannot be trusted to illustrate 
skill expertise. and give a dozen or so local examples to support their claim. 
When I make the opposite assertion. I also have only a dozen local examples 
in mind, but for my claim a dozen examples is proof. 
Some may fear that lawyers will resent being thought of as pata and refuse 
to cooperate with a program that looks at them in that way. If true, this 
would be an important concern for the outside office format because of its 
heavy reliance on lawyer cooperation. But the concern need not materialize 
if the clinical professor understands and appreciates both his and the 
attorney's role. A skilled lawyer has internalized a sophisticated repertoire of 
habits, beliefs, motor skills, tacit theories, and practical wisdom that are 
indispensable to good law practice and almost impossible to duplicate. A 
clinical course must provide access to such expertise or it shortchanges 
instrumental concerns and has nothing on which to ground its critical 
analysis. Clinicians cannot provide this expertise because typically they do 
not possess it and if they do, they cannot be both data and critic. The outside 
attorney is the professor's necessary and coequal collaborator, and he must 
be viewed in that light. 
64. I have taught in clinical practice programs in two small cities (Charlottesville. Virginia. 
and Bloomington. Indiana) and on!." large one ( Bos10n. :\lassachusettsl. and found the 
small city preferable on almost every count. In small cities judges and lawvers have more 
time to spend with students and take it. cases proceed in a more timely fashion. pron·dural 
mechanisms are applied as written rather than short-circuited oecause of time and case load 
pressures. and clients and witnesses are more accessible and thus available fm more 
extensive consultation. There are problems with small city practice. of course. but if 
casework is over the sophistication threshold (which is not high-small cases are now 
thought the best teaching vehicles even in big cities). they are more manageable problems. 
The small communities I have had experienct' with have had at least 50.000 citiLens. Small 
town and ruml pmctice seems different. see Donald D. Landon. Clil•nts. Colleagm·s. and 
Community: The Shaping of Zt•alous Advocacy in Country Law Practice. 1985 :\mer. Bar. 
Found. Rl•s. j. 81 (1985). and may nm be as adapted to clinical practice instrunion. 
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The clinician must also recognize that his task is not to pass judgment on 
attorney work. He asks why issues are defined, options limited, and choices 
made as they are, but these are questions about the profession as much as 
any particular attorney, and more important, they are questions. not 
competing conceptions of appropriate skill performance advanced 
indirectly under the guise of inquiry. The professor is engaged in studying 
the profession, not grading it. In fact, patterns that appear problematic to 
the professor might well turn out to have more to be said for them than the 
professor has surmised. Because he often will lack the attorney's more 
extensive knowledge of the situation, the professor will be wrong or at least 
incomplete in his analysis a fair amount of the time. In those instances 
when specific attorney decisions are properly called into question, the 
professor's comments should interest the attorney as much as the student. 
Insightful evaluation, if presented badly, can provoke resentment, but this is 
a failure of execution, not design. Thinking of the outside attorney as data is 
a respectful view and enough lawyers will understand it in that way. Those 
who do not usually do not make good clinical supervisors.65 
The outside office program has several further advantages over the 
conventional clinic. To begin with, it dqes not make a disproportionate 
claim on the limited law school resources of money, credit hours, and 
student time, and until it can be shown that there is something special about 
the conventional clinic that claim is greedy. I have taught clinical courses in 
every credit hour format, from full semester for fifteen credits to three-hour 
seminar, and in both conventional and 'outside office settings, and have 
found no knockdown arguments for the benefits of the conventional clinic. 
Thus, I do not think that such a special factor can be shown to exist. More 
important, an outside office program is likely to generate more critical 
insight than the conventional clinic because it separates critique and those 
who do it (professors) from producing data for critique and those who do it 
(lawyers). It is not a problem that a professor sympathizes with a lawyer's 
position, in fact this is often helpful, but when the first reaction to a work 
product is to defend rather than analyze it {even if unself-consciously) the 
professor is not performing effectively as a law teacher. Professors are less 
likely to identify emotionally with the decisions being evaluated, their 
defenses are less likely to be triggered, and the full range of their critical 
insights is more likely to be available for discussion with students when the 
work being reviewed is not their own or that of a close colleague. 
The outside office structure parallels that of the traditional law 
classroom, in which the teacher feels little emotional identification with the 
opinion being analyzed. Because clinical teachers and students work with 
persons whose decisions they sometimes question, the analogy to the 
clas_1;room is not perfect. But these differences can be seen as presenting an 
opportunity to teach about learning from colleagues, not a self-evident or 
65. See Condlin. Socrates' New Clothes. supra note I. at248-74; and Kreiling, supra note 5, at 
300-306, for discussions of the difficulties in this process. 
HeinOnline -- 36 J. Legal Educ. 71 1986
The Clinic and Political Critique il 
easy process when done well.66 Students can record conversations. with 
supervising attorneys in which they are both giving and receiving evaluative 
comments (the students' 0\'1.-n, it is important that the students not become 
mere messengers for professor commentary) and analyze those transcripts 
for their "learning-mode"67 properties. Learning to learn can become part 
of the clinical practice instructional agenda. Even here, emotional distance 
from the particulars of the conversations under study, even if not complete. 
is a valuable quality in the professor's direction of the analysis. 
The outside office is also more representative of the so-called real world of 
law practice.68 The caseload and client population are usually more diverse. 
presenting a wider choice of analytical problems and personality profiles. 
The absence of a captive client market in many of these offices makes the 
attorney-client relationship, in Douglas ~osenthal's phrase. more 
participatory, though as Rosenthal also shows the freedom to hire someone 
else does not always act as a check on lawyer domination. 69 Decisions about 
quantity and nature of the work to be done are in the hands of lawyers not 
professors, who are likely to give their contracts with diems and the limits 
of their resources priority over their agreements to help students learn. 
Client goals and limitations on resources are powerful constraints on Ia wyer 
learning in all but the conventional clinic and are boundaries within which 
students must learn to operate. The differences between an actual law office 
and a clinic can be overstated, but they are real differences nonetheless. If it 
is possible to live a full, critical life of the mind in the practice of law, it 
must be possible and it is certainly necessary to show how this is done in an 
actual law office. Students ought to be skeptical of anything les!>. ;o 
Ironically, a variation of the outside office format also may be equally 
suited for training in practical skills. Two things are necessary to train in 
skills: (I) a set of images of excellent performance which can become 
standards for evaluating one's own efforts, and (2) the opportunity to 
rehearse a skill and review that rehearsal until the motor dimension ol the 
skill is under control. Access to elite and senior practitioners allows the 
outside office to offer a larger catalogue of excellent skill images and thus 
helps students develop more sophisticated standards of practice. Opportunity 
66. Having prdctitioners and professors work in teams. in which one mc.>mber takes principal 
responsibility for skill judgments and the other for critique, is at least as likrlv to ptoducc 
the type of reflective practice proponents of clinic-al education say they want as the present 
strategy of trying to make single individuals (whc.>ther lawyer or professor) equallv adept at 
both processes. In this respt!ct. the outside office format contains the.> ~eeds of an alternative 
conception of law practice that makes it as much a program of strucuual tdorm for tht! 
legal profession as a pedagogical innovation. It also provides a befiinning vehidt• to help 
law schools exploit the educational potential of part-time work by students. 
67. See Condlin. Socrates' New Clothes. supra note I. at 235-42. for a description of "lt·arning 
mode" properties. 
68. No single office is representative of practice as a whole. and this increases the risk of 
overgeneralization. see note 6 supra, but this is a problem principally for clinical programs 
• that rely on fieldwork for all of their data. 
69. See Rosenthal. supra note 8. at 29-63. 
70. cr. Gordon. supra note 39. at 8 (10 impart "professionalism" law school Wlll>•.·s net•d the 
example of successful real world lawyers). 
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for drill is more difficult to provide, but if the professor is willing to 
supplement casework with simulation exercises in the skills under study, 
little is lost in the way of improved performance. Because simulation 
exercises can be designed, manipulated, and repeated, they are more likely 
than casework to develop desired habits, and habit is the foundation of skill. 
In fact, it is an illusion to believe that skill proficiency can be acquired in 
the semester or year available for the conventional clinic, where drill is and 
cannot be continuous. Preparing simulation exercises places more of a 
burden on the clinical professor, but that is not an objection to the format. 
Because cooperating attorneys will delegate less work tha~ conventional 
clinicians the outside office will present fewer opportunities for students to 
perform certain types of lawyer tasks (e.g., argument to court, examination 
of witnesses, deposition taking, and other publicly performed skills). 
Decreased opportunity to perform is traded off for increased opportunity for 
critique, however, on the belief that over time critical analysis of early 
practice experience pays greater dividends than the experience itself. In an 
ideal world an outside office would provide the same practice opportunities 
as the conventional clinic, and on occasion it will be possible to find such 
offices. But most of the time in establishing a practice program a choice 
must be made between creating opportunities for experience and 
opportunities for critique, and I suggest that critique be chosen. 
Adoption of the outside office format is likely to have effects over both the 
long and short term. Over the long term it will encourage more critically 
inclined persons to enter clinical teaching. New law teachers will not be 
discouraged from choosing clinical subjects by the prospect of running a 
law firm or being the attorney of record on a large number of cases. They 
will know from the outset that practice responsibilities will not be 
mandatory, and to the extent that such responsibilities are chosen, they will 
not be so all-encompassing as to prevent teaching in nonpractice formats, 
doing research, or writing. In the short term, the model will free existing 
clinicians from the impossible burden of being equally adept at both 
practice and critique. Some will discover that they prefer practice and 
redesign their teaching toward that end, while others will decide the 
opposite. Either decision, as long as it is freely made, works to the benefit of 
clinical teachers and law schools alike. 
The outside office model also provides a framework within which the 
clinical efforts of traditional law faculty can be conceptualized and 
coordinated. With varying but sometimes great frequency, traditional 
teachers offer clinical courses in areas of their substantive expertise. 
Arrangements for fieldwork are made on an ad hoc basis, and typically do 
not continue beyond the end of the course. Such efforts ought to be 
encouraged because they help flesh out a school's clinical curriculum and 
involve all of the faculty in the important task of studying lawyer practice 
behavior.71 Many traditional teachers have a good deal to say about lawyer 
71. See W. Burleue Carter, Robert Gordon Gives Twemv·Fifth Holmes Lectures: Traces the 
Tradition of American Lawyers to Present, 80 Harv. L. Rec. 4-5, 16 (March I. 1985), on the 
importance of studying lawyer behavior. 
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practices but need a format that does not swallow them up. The 
requirements of coverage and coordination suggests that someone ought to 
work in the clinical field full-time, but clinical study property conceived is 
too important to be left only to clinicians. 
Finally, it should be made clear that the outside office format is not a 
move backward toward the "apprenticeship'' model of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.72 Apprenticeship trivialized practice 
instruction by emphasizing mundane information (e.g., where to find the 
proper form) and mechanical skills (e.g., arrangement for service of 
process). Students were used as mere resources, or often forgotten altogether 
for large parts of the time spent in their mentors' offices. Clinical teachers, 
as heirs to the apprenticeship tradition, devised the conventional clinic as a 
means of avoiding these abuses. The key to intellectual quality control, it 
was thought, was to place instruction under the exclusive direction of a full-
time law teacher, and the easiest. in fact. only sure way to do this was to 
create a law office within the law school itself. This was a reasonable view 
two decades ago, when the content of clinical study was largely undefined 
and format was the only thing about which one could be certain. But as that 
content has begun to emerge, rigidity about format looks increasingly like a 
"compulsory chapel" view.73 As identity develops, fewer environments are 
threatening. 
An outside office program is likely to avoid the abuses of apprenticeship 
and the so-called farm-out clinics because it locates the teaching function in 
a law school professor rather than an attorney, and places emphasis on 
critical understanding rather than on acquisition of skill, information, or 
lore. The student is judged on his analysis, not performance of lawyer 
practices, and experience is important as data. not for its own sake. In the 
end, an outside office program embodies the best features of apprenticeship 
and the conventional clinic, access to mainstream law practice and 
practitioners from one, and full-time law professor instruction from the 
other, and combines these features with the critical perspective of the 
university at large to form the next logical step in the development of 
formats for clinical practice. 74 
72. For discussions of apprenticeship see Robert Stevens. Law School: Legal Education in 
America from the 1850s to the 1980s 3. 10-11 notes 5, 6 (Chapel Hill. N.C .. 1983); and E. 
Gordon Gee 8e Donald W. Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer 
Competency, 1977 B.Y.U. L Rev. 695, 722-27. 731-43. 
73. See Robert Stevens, Preface, 1977 B.Y.U. L Rev. 689,692-94. 
74. An argument for the outside oHice format is not an endorsement of existing clinical 
externship, internship. or farm-out practice programs. Most such programs have skills 
training as their goal and use the outside omce only to help keep costs down. Since skills 
training is the wrong objective for a practice program these programs are misguided from 
the start. The key to a successful practice program is a clirtical teacher interested in critical 
not instrumental questions, of the sort illustrated earlier in the discussion of the 
"snowball" case. See notes 54-56 supra. The outside office format is important, not in 
itself, but as the structure most likelv to altract clinicians with critical interests and to 
provide adequate opportunity for tho;e interests to be explored. 
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IV. Qualifications, Variations, and Problems of Implementation 
The foregoing remarks should not be read as an unqualified dismissal of 
the conventional clinic. I mean to suggest only that the clinic is not an 
indispensable feature of clinical instruction, not that it should never be 
used. Schoob that have not yet invested in a clinic may want to think twice 
before doing so. but those that have made the investment need not abandon 
it. The conventional clinic performs several functions better than the 
outside office, and these will remain important functions to perform. To 
begin with. a law school. as part of its obligation of good citizenship, could 
establish a clinic to provide legal representation to persons or interests that 
would otherwise go unrepresented.i5 Instructional benefits from such an 
office would be considered desirable but nor essential to its continued 
support. Several schools whose clinics predate the clinical education 
movement seem to have acted on this motive. and others may have.76 This 
reason is compelling to many though not all, and a school said to have 
established a clinic for such purposes ought to have debated the issue in 
those terms. 
The remaining functions are connected more directly with instruction. 
One involves the situation mentioned earlier in which the quality of local 
practice is not high, or the nature of local casework not sophisticated, and a 
law school clinic is the best means for providing students with indh•idual 
and organizational models of excellent practice. Here, the clinic is chosen 
because it is the lesser of all evils. The conventional clinic is also better 
suited for those students who need to take their first law practice steps in 
smaller increments than outside law firms can economically accommodate. 
Such students require smaller than average assignments, regular and 
frequent access to supervisors, and supplementary counseling and support. 
When ready, however, evP.n these students ought to work in outside office 
programs where they can try out newly developed skills and understanding 
under conditions more representative of future work settings. 77 
A conventional clinic established for the above (or other) reasons, still 
should be structured as much as possible along the lines set our in this 
discussion. Supervision of lawyering should be separated from critical 
analysis (e.g., students should have two supervisors), critique should be 
given priority over skills training, and supervision should be approached as 
the elaboration of a body of ideas rather than the production of a set of 
experiences. Some of these tasks will be difficult to accomplish in the 
75. See Bloch, supra note 5, at 322 note 3. and articles cited therein for a discussion of rliniral 
education's citizenship obligation. 
76. Possibilities with which I am familiar are Harvard. Tennessee, Chicago, Denvrr. 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Boston College, and Georgetown law schools. 
77. The conventional clinic is also better suited to the critique of ideology. See note 13 supra. 
To transcend ideological constraints professors and students must be both lawyers and 
professors and generate data about their simultaneous participation in t•adt rolt·. Tht• 
conventional clinic guarantees such data, but the outsidl' office does not. Critique of 
ideology is the most advanced form of clinical study. however, and ought to bt• undertaken 
only after a student has completed the full cliniral sequence. including tht• outside offit'e 
program. 
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conventional format but it is better that they be realized partly than not at 
all. None detracts from what the conventional clinic would otherwise 
contribute to student learning. 7B 
The ideas proposed here may encounter some resistance. Students, for 
example, may presume that the conventional clinic is superior to the 
outside office for two principal reasons. First, for many students working on 
live cases is new and exciting, much like being in the first semester of law 
school all over again, only better because this time the study is obviously 
relevant to law practice. Often, it does not matter that the training is 
unsophisticated and uncritical in some larger sense, as it did not matter in 
first year that case analysis was often simplistic. What is important is that it 
is "real." Critique of lawyer practices may look overly academic by 
comparison and come at a time when student tolerance for academic 
approaches is low. Second, students may prefer the increased responsibility 
for client interests the outside o££ice delegates because they think it is a sign 
that they are being treated as adults.79 Not respecting student maturity is a 
serious law school problem, and students are right to want more adult 
treatment than law schools typically provide, but the problem is not solved 
by the temporary and limited measure of placing students in clinics. This 
uses the clinic as a placebo and leaves the law school social structure 
relatively intact. Development of genuine respect for student maturity 
requires different measures. 
Clinical teachers also make a variation of the "responsibility" argument. 
The clinic is the best place to teach responsibility, they say, because being in 
charge of a client's case develops character, speeds up maturation, and 
reduces the risk of undependable lawyers being lapsed on an unsuspecting 
public. To an extent this is true. Taking responsibility is an important part 
of learning to be responsible, and work on a client's case is as good a vehicle 
for taking responsibility as any. But instruction depends upon format and 
expertise, and there is no evidence to indicate that clinical teachers are 
expert at understanding or teaching about the process of becoming 
responsible.80 Lawyer skill practice, not maturation, is the clinical subject 
78. Law schools also ought to experiment with other clinical practice formats. One with 
promise has schools with o££ice space 10 spare renting it-along with rights to the library. 
special access to students, and the like, to existing law firms at below market rates in return 
for the £irms' agreements to provide clinical practice npportunities and to allow themselves 
to be studied. Participating firms could be chosen on the quality o£ their work. 
organizational characteristics, subject matter concentrations, or whatever other features a 
school wished to draw on in its practice courses. In this model. a firm would maintain its 
structure and identity, but operate out of a law school so to speak. This approach has 
several advantages, not the least o£ which is that it gives law schools access to more 
experienced and elite clinical mentors. Terms of the contract between a school and a firm 
would take careful thought, but it is conceivable that the obligations on each side would 
not be so onerous as to prevent a££iliation. Such a project is now under way at the 
University of Maryland Law School. 
79. But see Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes, supra note I. at 2·18-74 (illustration o£ how 
ostensibly respectful supervisory behavior c-.m in fact be manipulative). 
80. For example, in the scholarly literature few if any clinicians draw on or show an awareness 
o£ the considerable body o£ psychological and philosophical literature on moral 
development. 
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matter. and most clinicians go beyond the limits of their competence when 
they leave the realm of skill practice behind. Interestingly enough, this 
argument, like so many others for clinical instruction. focuses on a 
peripheral feature that is part of all law study, traditional and clinical alike. 
Such arguments make it seem as if clinical study has no distinct 
contribution to make to the study of law, that· there is no discrete body of 
ideas which is central to understanding law and specific to the clinical 
vantage point. 
In addition, students ar~ likely to be more interested in social and 
political critique of lawyer practices than they initially realize. Their 
impressions of w• 'rking in law firms often are uninspiring because they 
have not had the opportunity to interpret or criticize tho!>e impressions in 
all the dimensions they associate with good thinking. It is the instrumental. 
simplistic, or noncritical nature of their observations which is troublesome. 
more often than the subject of law practice itself. Students are surprist•d to 
discover the critical side to clinical study but find such analysis 11atisfying 
and important once it is understood. When these impressions seep into the 
collective consciousness of a student body at large, agitation for conventional 
(as opposed to more) clinical instruction usually abates. Thosl' who are 
troubled by all forms of authority will continue to see the conventional 
clinic as the only work in which they can be their own bosses. but this 
concern is not one that law schools will be able or should 'try to relieve. HI 
It might be more difficult to persuade clinical teachers of the merits of the 
outside office format. Part of the reason, I suspect, is that clinicians are more 
often practitioners than scholars or critics of law practice, and are more 
interested in training than critique. They have a conception of lawyer skills 
to transmit, a tacit belief in the staying power of the present system for 
adjudicating disputes, and a desire to inculcate the best-known ways of 
manipulating that system.82 But they are less interested in conceiving of 
alternative institutional arrangements or new practice methodologies. This 
is more than a concern with perserving a conception of clinical teaching one 
knows how to do best. Even the non-self-interested clinician will give 
critique a low priority if he believes he can practice successfully without it; 
and it is easy for him to believe this. Critique's contributions to practice are 
subtle, indirect, and incremental over time, so as not to be easily perceived 
by a person preoccupied with other important and pressing tasks.83 Unless 
he values critical understanding for its own sake and is willing to suspend 
judgment on its practical value, a clinician will view almost any specific 
instance of it as unimportant, and the issue will come up only in specific 
instances. Reasoning from this mistaken premise, he will have no cause to 
doubt his conclusion and no experience on which to base the opposite 
conclusion. He will not discuss this belief publicly because it is not highly 
81. A more critical approach to clinical study might also attract top-ranking students. whn now 
often avoid clinical courses as too vocational. 
82. See note 38 supra. 
83. See Simon. supra note 21. at 503 Cmmribution of rritiml theory to pranin· is indin·nJ. 
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regarded in the law school ~nvironment. but he will believe in and act on it 
nonetheless. 
Some clinical teachers once espoused critical objectives but at different 
points gave them up to represent clients and run law offices." The prospect of 
changing the world for the better through the power of law and law students 
was the principal motive. An army of law students marching forth from 
clinics, uncorrupted by money or the desire to make it. was seriously 
considered to be one of the poor's best hopes. The romantic nature of this 
vision may have enhanced its appeal to the former legal services lawyers 
who made up most of the cadre of early clinical teachers. For others. 
running a law office was a familiar and enjoyable task. and one that was 
easier to perform successfully under the often hostile scrutiny of traditional 
law faculty. Those who followed this route soon found themselves 
managing bureaucracies, but by the time they realized this they had invested 
too heavily in their choices to back away (those who wanted to). With this 
background. clinical teachers might understandably resist the suggestion 
that the conventional clinic is limited in basic ways. 
A few clinical programs are structured along the lines described in this 
article. They divide lawyering from critique and give critique the highl'r 
priority, conceive of the clinical subject as a body of ideas rather than a set of 
experiences, and evaluate students not on their performance of lawyer 
practices but on their understanding and criticism of them. These programs 
are not often defended in these terms, but I suggest that such a defense 
would be more coherent and would explain better the aims of the programs. 
Persons in charge of such programs will find the arguments to this article 
easy to adopt because they have been speaking prose all along. 
V. Conclusion 
From even this limited discussion it should be apparent that prevailing 
conceptions of clinical practice instruction are no longer adequate. 
Practicing law is not the same as critically understanding law practice. and 
by conflating the two the conventional clinic is likely to produce the worst 
of both worlds, routinized practice and self-interested critique. Practice is a 
precondition to critique, to be sure, but in an educational setting it must 
also be subservient to it, and this is difficult to attain in the conventional 
clinic. Some will see this appraisal as unduly negative, and believe that it 
stems from a lack of sympathy for clinical instruction in general. This 
would be wrong. The development of the practice clinic is a milestone in 
the history of American legal education. Beyond its rejuvenation of law 
school pedagogy, the clinic called much needed attention to lawyer skill 
practice as an independent variable affecting the justice of the legal system. 
and created many of the conditions necessary to integrating the study of that 
practice with more traditional parts of the study of law. For its contributions. 
both realized and inchoate, the clinic is now an enduring part of the story of 
legal education, and rightfully so. But as is often the case with potentially 
radical reform, momentum weakened before potential was realized and 
clinical education as implemented became an instrumental shadow of 
clinical education as conceived. The clinical vantage point. a modified .. bad 
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man" view that looks at legal norms from the perspective of how they will 
be manipulated by lawyers, still has the potential to inform our 
understanding of legal theory and law practice at the most sophisticated 
levels. But for this potential to be exploited new clinical formats must be 
created, ones that provide time for detached critical reflection, and are 
concerned with expanding our understanding of what is possible more than 
with passing on what is presently known. If this restructuring is not 
undertaken, the clinical education becomes trapped in static, instrumental, 
and mechanical ·conceptions of law practice, no matter how clever, it will 
and should remain at the curricular margin. Clinical study must evolve-
not to survive, clinical positions are secure for the foreseeable future-but 
because there is still work to be done. 
